Did We Tame the Beast: Views on the US Financial Reform Bill by Baxter, Lawrence G.
Journal of Regulation & Risk North Asia 209
Financial reform bill
Did we tame the beast: views 
on the US Financial Reform Bill 
Duke University’s Prof Lawrence Baxter 
takes a microscope to the ‘Dodd-Frank’ Bill 
finding a veritable ’Micrographia’ of doubt.
THIS paper was written in anticipation 
of the US Financial Reform Bill’s !nal 
passage through Congress prior to being 
signed into law by President Obama on 
July 5 – obviously this is now not the 
case. The Bill currently before Congress 
was devised to address problems associ-
ated with the global !nancial crisis (GFC) 
of  2007-2009.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, which by its very 
title indicates the complicated nature of the 
reforms, is actually not yet law.  The Bill, which 
I will refer to as “Dodd-Frank” for the rest of 
this paper, now hangs in limbo, having been 
passed by the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, subsequently reported out of 
Conference Committee and finally approved 
by the House, but not quite yet enacted by 
Congress.  
Two more votes remain in the Senate. 
The first will be whether to stop with a 
cloture vote an attempted filibuster by the 
Republican minority, which would prevent 
the bill from coming to a floor vote. If the 
Senate votes for cloture a second vote will 
then approve the legislation by a likely mar-
gin of about 59 votes to 40. Only then can 
the Bill go to the President for signature. 
These final votes are scheduled for next 
week when Congress returns from the July 
Fourth recess.  So we will not know until next 
week whether 12 months of intense effort in 
Congress and two years of aftershocks from 
the GFC will actually lead to financial reform 
in the United States. If, however, Dodd-
Frank is signed into law, the United States 
will become the first major nation to hon-
our its commitment to the G20 to reform its 
financial system.
Dodd-Frank in general  
This legislation is neither uncontroversial 
nor sure to be effective. The Bill has engen-
dered a range of reactions, ranging from sav-
age criticism to effusive self-promotion by 
Congressional leaders and the President. At 
the conservative end of the spectrum, a pro-
fessor at Stanford writes that Dodd-Frank 
is a “financial fiasco.”  The ubiquitous Judge 
Richard Posner, having recently turned his 
attention to the subject of banking regula-
tion and become a Keynesian after years in 
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the Milton Friedman camp, has described 
the bill as “politics in the worst sense.” 
Liberal commentators have mixed reactions 
too, with Lynn Parramore declaring the bill 
to be “both disappointing and inspiring”  and 
Chris Bowers, co-founder of the organisa-
tion known as OpenLeft, advocating that 
despite its shortcomings it is still worth sup-
porting and the last chance to “really take 
on the banks.”   Even Paul  Volcker, former 
chairman of the Fed and after whom one of 
the major new activity restrictions in Dodd-
Frank is named, is said to be disappointed 
with how that restriction – the Volcker Rule 
– was watered down in order to secure 
Republican votes.  There is indeed enough in 
the massive 2,307-page bill to delight, anger 
and/or befuddle everybody to some extent.  
Not a complete bill
Dodd-Frank also conspicuously avoids 
two major areas of greatly needed reform, 
namely regulatory consolidation among the 
nation’s illogical morass of financial regula-
tors, and restructuring of the GSE system 
designed to promote easy access to home 
mortgages, such as Fannie Mae and Freddy 
Mac. These dysfunctional organisations, in 
the view of many, were among the signifi-
cant contributors to the GFC.  
Finally, implementation of the Bill awaits 
over 200 rule-making processes by the 
implementing agencies! These regulatory 
elaborations will add considerable depth to 
the legislative framework and their outcome, 
far from predictable, will depend on further 
intense lobbying by all the stakeholders at 
the less visible level of the administrative 
process.  
Yet there is no doubt that Dodd-Frank 
will profoundly reshape financial services for 
decades to come.  There is much in it that I 
would praise.  
What’s hot
Consumers have received short shrift in 
recent years as financial products have 
become more byzantine, and only a preda-
tory lender, auto dealer, or Washington lob-
byist would argue that is it acceptable that 
ordinary consumers should have to engage 
professional assistance merely to under-
stand the terms of their mortgages or credit 
card agreements. As the damage incurred 
by complex – some would say unneces-
sary – products sold aggressively to inves-
tors has escalated it is also important that 
the professionals in the business be placed 
under increasing standards of care in their 
disclosures and conduct; this, too, is partly 
addressed in the legislation.  
The derivatives market is presently rather 
like the foreign exchange market of a decade 
ago:  money is made as much through the 
privileged access to information as through 
actual value added, and in the case of deriva-
tives which can have such massive contin-
gencies the strengthening of the exchange 
infrastructure and market transparency is an 
urgent necessity.  The introduction of proper 
supervision is also to be welcomed.
Mission accomplished?
Given space restrictions, it is impossible to 
give a wide-ranging summary of the Dodd-
Frank reforms. Instead, one’s intent is to focus 
on a single important question; namely, does 
the legislation squarely face and adequately 
address the problem of financial instabil-
ity so as to significantly reduce the risk of 
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another collapse in the financial system? 
The threat of destabilisation is the beast that 
lurks under the gigantic, volatile and labile 
financial system upon which global pros-
perity and security depends. Have we in the 
United States done our part to challenge this 
beast? 
My view is that we have not. We have 
made a partial and reasonably good faith 
attempt, but we have not truly come to grips 
with one of the central causes of financial 
instability, namely the massive global finan-
cial institutions now roaming the planet. 
I will adopt the term in regulatory use for 
these institutions: large, complex financial 
institutions, or LCFIs. Just as we saw with the 
failure of Lehman Brothers and the near col-
lapse of AIG, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Lloyds and others in 2008, 
the failure of any one LCFI would inflict seri-
ous disruption on the entire financial system. 
Issue of ‘too-big-to-fail’
These and many other financial institutions 
are now more or less openly acknowledged 
to be “too important to fail,” “too big to fail” or, 
more euphemistically, “systemically impor-
tant.”  Despite bold declarations and efforts 
in the legislation to restrict future govern-
ment assistance, the Dodd-Frank legislation 
does not do enough to address this problem 
and, for as long as these LCFIs operate at 
their current scale and complexity, the finan-
cial system will remain fragile and vulnerable 
to massive sudden shocks.
It is true that Dodd-Frank purports to 
deal with the problem and has been sold as 
having dealt with it.  But in the ultimate anal-
ysis it has not. This is because Dodd-Frank 
assumes that LCFIs can be safely operated, 
regulated and, if necessary, liquidated. 
However, as long as LCFIs are permitted to 
operate at their current scale and complex-
ity they will not and cannot in practice be 
allowed to fail, no matter what the legisla-
tion permits or prohibits and no matter what 
Senator Dodd, Congressman Frank or offi-
cials at the Treasury Department declare to 
the contrary.
Financial stability 
Of all the anxiety stemming from the GFC, 
perhaps the greatest is fear of widespread 
domestic and international financial insta-
bility. While specific and localised bank fail-
ures are surely always painful, they seem 
to be part of the normal functioning of 
economic systems – a manifestation of the 
Schumpeterian “creative destruction” that 
ensures the very survival of capitalism itself. 
It is not such specific failures but rather wide-
spread breakdowns of the kind we experi-
enced with the GFC that instil the real fear. 
Prevalence of financial crises
This fear is well founded. The GFC is only 
the latest in a long line of similar crises. 
Many earlier crises are well known, includ-
ing: the Dutch Tulip Mania of 1637; South 
Sea Bubble of 1720 ; Mississippi Company in 
1720;  Great Crash of 1929; and, of course, 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.  
Crashes have occurred in almost every 
economic region of the globe.  It might come 
as a surprise to learn that there have been 
more than 112 systemic-scale financial crises 
in over 90 countries over the past 30 years. 
Indeed, such crises are now twice as preva-
lent today than they were a century ago.   And 
we don’t seem to be making much progress 
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in eliminating them. Systemic risk has really 
only recently attracted much attention.  
The first glimmers of concern arose in 
1974 when a relatively small financial insti-
tution in Germany, Bankhaus Herstatt, failed 
unexpectedly, generating overnight shocks 
to financial institutions in other countries 
that were exposed to losses resulting from 
their inability to settle currency trades with 
Herstatt in the later time zones.  
A much more massive version of the sys-
temic phenomenon occurred when Lehman 
Brothers was allowed to fail on September 
15, 2008. Lehman became the largest bank-
ruptcy in US history even though the invest-
ment bank was by no means the largest US 
financial institution. Credit markets froze 
overnight as financial institutions took 
defensive action to mitigate their exposures 
and anticipate potential losses. This was the 
event that effectively plunged the world into 
the GFC.  
Founding of Basel Committee
The Herstatt failure prompted the creation 
by the G10 of a Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices, 
known as the “Basel Committee.”  Over the 
past three decades the Basel Committee 
and another committee working out of its 
offices and created by the G20, the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) (before 2009 the 
Financial Stability Forum), have worked on 
various ways to reduce the vulnerability of 
the global financial system.  
Obviously these institutions failed mis-
erably in preventing or even anticipating 
the current crisis – a story too complicated 
to investigate here today.  Nevertheless, our 
dim understanding of what leads to such 
crises, if not our ability to stop them, has 
actually improved.  We have better economic 
data at both the global and domestic levels 
and regarding the histories of specific finan-
cial institutions. Clear patterns do seem to 
emerge in the cycle from boom to bust. In 
recent months governments and markets 
have been reacting apprehensively to all 
kinds of signals of possible systemic failure, 
ranging from the risk of sovereign defaults 
in Dubai and the Eurozone to possible asset 
bubbles in Beijing and Shanghai.  
Financial scale and scope
Fluctuating with the ebb and flow of eco-
nomic globalisation are the fortunes of 
financial institutions themselves. Their scope 
and interconnectedness are increasing as 
fast as the spread of global finance, and their 
individual sizes have escalated at spectacu-
lar rates in recent years. There are now 180 
financial institutions with assets greater than 
$50 billion, with 39 each having more than 
$500 billion in assets. The largest (currently 
BNP Paribas) holds just under $3 trillion. 
Many of these institutions have been kept 
alive only through massive injections of 
public funding. Among these financial insti-
tutions, many, including some of the biggest, 
have grown rapidly, more than doubling in 
size over the past five to 10 years.  
Bank of England study
Despite their assertions of efficiencies of 
scale, these financial conglomerates have 
long ceased to be as efficient as their smaller 
counterparts. So their economic value is 
questionable.  What is worse is that the value 
of the de facto public subsidies they enjoy is 
substantial. 
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A respected study by the Bank of England 
recently suggested that the public sub-
sidy of the five largest banks in the United 
Kingdom has been running at $30 bil-
lion per year.  A similar study in the United 
States suggests that the subsidy derived 
from the US Treasury’s TARP programme for 
the top 18 banks is approximately $34 bil-
lion/ year. In both studies the largest banks 
take the lion’s share of this public subsidy. 
Furthermore, both studies look at only one 
aspect of various state-backed advantages 
large financial institutions enjoy; there are 
indeed various other forms of support that 
generate a broader aggregate subsidy.
The international financial system is 
greatly dependent on the fortunes of these 
ultra large financial institutions. Difficulties 
experienced by any one such institution 
leads to one of two inevitable results:  either 
additional public subsidies are required to 
keep the institution open, or letting it go into 
bankruptcy will lead to widespread financial 
disruption and even general instability – as 
witnessed during the GFC. This is why such 
institutions that have become known in the 
United States as TBTF.
Dodd-Frank solution
How does the Dodd-Frank Bill address this 
problem? One obvious way would have 
been to impose limitations on the size of 
financial institutions. An amendment pro-
posed by two senators did indeed place such 
an option squarely before the Senate.  Their 
amendment, however, met fierce opposi-
tion from the large banks and the Treasury 
Department and was eventually defeated. 
Instead Dodd-Frank delegated the problem 
to the regulators. The regulatory approach to 
the problem is to: supervise the health of the 
individual institutions themselves (so-called 
“microprudential” regulation); monitor the 
systemic inter-dependence of each financial 
institution as they interact within the broader 
financial system (so-called “macropruden-
tial” regulation); and  promote, through the 
medium of the G20, Basle Committee and 
FSB, greater international co-operation in 
order to address the transborder intercon-
nections among LCFIs.
Regulatory approach
Consistent with this regulatory oriented 
approach, and accepting the position of the 
US Treasury Secretary that regulators should 
possess the discretion to act appropriately 
when dangers arise, Dodd-Frank creates 
an elaborate and graduated framework for 
regulatory action.  
1.) The Bill creates sophisticated machin-
ery designed to anticipate and react to the 
buildup of systemic risk. This consists of the 
new Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
informed by a new Office of Financial 
Research in the Treasury Department, which 
has the responsibility of collecting economic 
data and producing analysis to identify and 
monitor emerging systemic risks. Dodd-
Frank also casts a wide net over any financial 
institution that might contribute to this risk, 
whether it be a bank or not.
2.) Regulators are empowered to implement 
progressively tougher standards, ranging 
from capital requirements to activity restric-
tions to limits on single counterparty expo-
sures, in order to prevent such systemically 
significant institutions from becoming more 
risky.  The Bill prohibits certain types of con-
duct ex ante, though the implementation 
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periods are lengthy and it is far from clear 
that such activities, for example proprietary 
trading which will be banned by the so-
called Volcker Rule, are really all that impor-
tant in generating systemic risk, particularly 
given the exemptions created by the Bill and 
the lengthy implementation periods.  
The regulators can also extend this 
framework of supervision and limitations to 
financial institutions designated “systemi-
cally significant,” even if they are not banks. 
Such systemically significant institutions 
will also be required to develop their own 
“funeral plans” which would provide blue-
prints for their orderly shutdown when 
things go wrong.  
3.) Dodd-Frank prohibits direct bailouts, 
either by the lender of last resort or deposit 
insurer, that benefit an individual bank. The 
Fed may only provide emergency lending 
on a broad basis, and not solely for a specific 
institution, and then only with the approval 
of the Treasury Secretary. The FDIC, which 
protects the deposit insurance funds and 
depositors, has to get special – ultimately 
Presidential and Congressional – approval in 
order to guarantee debt in order to prevent 
a bank run.
4.)  New speedy resolution or liquidation 
procedures, similar to those that already 
apply to banks, are created for any financial 
institution deemed systemically significant. 
The FDIC, which is already the receiver for 
failed banks, will wind up financial institu-
tions forced into this bankruptcy system.
Yet the final iterations of Dodd-Frank 
have been met with many headlines 
declaring that the bill will not in fact have 
killed TBTF. Gretchen Morgenson of the 
New York Times identified “cutting big and 
interconnected financial entities down to 
size” as one of the most important objectives 
for successful reform.  In her assessment “the 
bill fails completely.”   
Dodd-Frank failings
I believe Morgenson’s evaluation is correct. 
We will have another crisis soon enough; 
indeed such crises seem ultimately unavoid-
able. If Congress, after the kind of crisis we 
have just been through, cannot itself impose 
scale limitations on very large financial insti-
tutions, I don’t think the regulators will ever 
be in a position to shut them down. And if 
financial institutions of current scale and 
complexity continue to operate, I don’t think 
that they can be shut down when a crisis 
occurs.  
Complexity of LCFIs
The primary reason for this gloomy outlook 
is that financial institutions have evolved to a 
degree of complexity and size where it is not 
only more likely that they will fail. It is also 
practically impossible to let them do so with-
out the cure being worse than the disease.It 
is more likely that financial Leviathans will 
run into serious difficulties because: 
(a) they are now beyond the level of com-
plexity at which risk can safely and reliably 
be managed; and, (b) it is unrealistic to think 
that current resources and techniques of 
regulation can meaningfully monitor them; 
and, (c) their sheer scale and complexity of 
operations spawns such deep mutual inter-
connectedness that the failure of any one 
creates the serious risk of failure by many 
others, as well as schools of smaller financial 
institutions.   
Such companies, let alone their 
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regulators, are still learning the skills of and 
developing the tools for the complex risk 
management necessary to operate on a 
large, global scale in a highly labile global 
financial market.  
It is not just credit and market risks that 
they must master (they have acquired con-
siderable experience at addressing these 
types of risk); it is also an increasingly com-
plicated level of operational risk, in which 
the diversity of such companies, coupled 
with the escalating sources of unexpected 
dangers – both functional and geographic 
– creates a situation with which BP would 
surely now identify: you simply will not see 
the lightning that hits you. I have yet to see a 
serious risk management or regulatory plan 
that adequately or reassuringly addresses 
such risk complexity.
Intervention paradox
It is less likely than ever that regulators will 
use their powers to shut down a large, sys-
temically risky institution because of what 
one might label the intervention paradox: 
just when the need to precipitate terminal 
action to seize a financial institution is great-
est, the incentives not to do so, and the abil-
ity of the institution itself to resist seizure, are 
also highest.  
The result is that such institutions are 
kept open to the point where they either 
become zombies – publicly subsidised and 
ultimately non-productive (i.e. not sustain-
ably profitable) wards of the state – or their 
collapse creates far greater damage on other 
institutions than should have been allowed.
To elaborate on this paradox, when 
financial institutions get into difficulty, finan-
cial agencies have two main responsibilities. 
If the problem for the institution is essen-
tially one of liquidity then the central bank’s 
job is to act as a lender of last resort.  
Paradox elaborated
If, on the other hand, there is a risk of a run 
on the bank, or if there is a danger that the 
bank’s failure will dissipate more capital than 
will be sufficient to cover repayment of the 
deposits, then the deposit insurer’s job is to 
take “prompt corrective action” to pre-empt 
the failure or, if this action is already too late, 
to seize the bank and put it through fast-
track receivership. When the bank is very 
large and systemically significant, the temp-
tation for both a central bank and deposit 
insurer is to try to keep the financial insti-
tution open in the hope that it will make it 
through the crisis and be able to rebuild.  
Small banks are relatively easy to close, 
and in the US the FDIC regularly closes fail-
ing banks with little disruption. But the clo-
sure of a complex large bank is both costly 
to the federal insurance funds and carries the 
risk of systemic damage to other financial 
institutions.  
IMF observations
As a recent study by the International 
Monetary Fund concluded:  “The failure of a 
systemically important institution increases 
the likelihood of failures among non-sys-
temic institutions. This means that any regu-
lator will be more lenient with a systemically 
important institution.” Furthermore, the 
actions of both types of regulators (lender 
of last resort and prompt corrective actor) 
become mutually reinforcing and likely to 
perpetuate the survival of weak but very 
large institutions. And this is before even 
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taking into account the intense lobbying 
power that such large institutions possess, 
which will almost certainly be deployed as 
a political barricade against any regulatory 
aspirations to the contrary.
The Dodd-Frank system would appear 
to eliminate the “too big to fail” possibility 
by prohibiting bailouts in all but the most 
restricted circumstances. 
But consider why the possibility of a bail-
out exists in the first place: the institutions 
we are talking about would generate all the 
conditions necessary for both emergency 
loans from the Fed and debt guarantees 
by the FDIC, precisely because their failure 
would have major systemic consequences 
the world over.
Restructuring TBTFs
So while the prudential measures devel-
oped by Dodd-Frank might in theory help 
reduce the threat of systemic danger, the 
continued existence of LCFIs, the failure of 
which would have major systemic conse-
quences, makes another major disruption to 
financial stability and another bailout all but 
inevitable.
There is, in my view (and the view of 
many others) only one way to install sys-
temic blowout preventers so as to mitigate, 
at least, the scale of damage caused by the 
next financial crisis.  This is to limit the size of, 
or substantially restructure into safer, more 
self-sealing subcomponents, the denizens 
that operate within the system. Limiting 
bank size will not entirely reduce complex-
ity (which generates operational risk and 
the possibility of institution failure) or inter-
connectedness (which generates systemic 
risk).  Indeed an industry paper makes the 
argument that size is not the problem; rather 
it is interconnectedness, a feature shared by 
smaller as well as larger institutions.  
Big equals unmanageable
Interconnectedness is indeed the capillary 
network of systemic risk. But the argument 
that size is irrelevant misses the point:  inter-
connectedness increases exponentially with 
size and above a certain scale risks start to 
become unmanageable. 
So limiting financial institution size 
would be not for the purpose of improving 
safety. Large scale virtually guarantees the 
presence of excessively complex risk. More 
important, the systemic impacts of failure are 
magnified by size.
The managerial culture of banking exac-
erbates the risks generated by scale. The 
advocates of large-scale banking, including 
most of the executives, tend to favour the 
centralised, branch and integrated model of 
universal banking because this model is per-
ceived to be more efficient.  
Over-centralisation risk
A unified corporate structure enables the 
organisation to leverage its capital over all 
of its operations and avoid the intra-affiliate 
legal, accounting and operational impedi-
ments among subsidiaries. Yet this same 
operational consolidation also conducts 
risk more freely across the corporate entitity. 
Some national regulators require foreign 
banks to establish local, separately capital-
ised and operated subsidiaries precisely in 
order to facilitate more effective domestic 
supervision. This  is part of the attraction 
of the non-operating holding company 
(NOHC) structure favoured by the United 
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States and some other countries. Affiliate 
transaction restrictions help to prevent trans-
mission of risk between the operating sub-
sidiaries, and it might be possible to refine 
structurally separate components further 
to produce safer conglomerates that can be 
managed more coherently and that contain 
stronger internal insulations when risks get 
out of control. 
Dodd-Frank indeed uses this technique 
to address the risks posed by hedge fund 
activity for banks by requiring that such activ-
ities be “pushed out” into separate subsidiar-
ies. Whether the LCFIs would welcome this 
approach is another matter, since the inter-
affiliate restrictions would necessarily reduce 
the “efficiencies” enjoyed by folding diverse 
operations into more monolithic corporate 
entities.
Rethinking the framework
In the absence of sound policy reasons for 
assuming the greater risks that such institu-
tions add to the system, it is therefore hard to 
see why it makes sense to continue, like deer 
in the headlights, to watch financial institu-
tions reach new scales that are beyond the 
capacity of regulators to supervise properly, 
at least with techniques currently available, 
and their own capacity to provide credible 
guarantees that they can be operated safely.  
Perhaps a combination of learning and 
technology will ultimately render very large-
scale banking safe. Yet even if this were the 
case, Dodd-Frank ultimately relies upon an 
outdated framework for matching the new 
world of finance.  
This is because, in my opinion, Dodd-
Frank is conceptually misconceived as a 
vehicle for promoting systemic financial 
safety. The global financial system is evolv-
ing so rapidly, is so volatile and so labile that 
it possesses the characteristics of a complex 
adaptive system – one that more resembles 
the weather than a product of intelligent 
central design.  
Prof Arner et al
If the global financial system is really more 
accurately understood as a truly complex 
environment in the scientific sense, then try-
ing to regulate modern global finance will 
require more nuanced, skilled and rapidly 
reactive regulation than commands, prohi-
bitions or greater enforcement powers.  New 
techniques of adaptive regulation must be 
developed to meet the fast-paced world of 
payments, financial dealing and innovation.  
Douglas Arner and his co-authors have 
recently completed major studies directed 
toward comprehensive redesign of the 
global financial system and its regulation,  so 
I would direct the audience to that study for a 
fuller understanding of the overall issues that 
must be addressed. 
Closing remarks
I will content myself by noting, in closing, 
that there are some elements of the financial 
ecosystem that can be controlled upfront. 
One of them is the size of the participants, 
so that at least the environmental damage 
caused by these players does not destroy the 
habitat for other creatures.  
In this important respect the Dodd-
Frank Bill has avoided dealing with a cen-
tral vulnerability to the financial system. 
This reform will almost certainly be back on 
the table after the next disaster, the odds of 
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